FROM NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TO EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS: BACK TO A FUTURE FOR EDUCATION FEDERALISM

INTRODUCTION
From a formal legal perspective, the initial years of the twenty-first century unmasked the nation's growing uncertainty about K-12 education federalism. America's long and deep tradition of local control over general education policy began to erode as the federal government entered discrete K-12 regulatory spaces, largely incident to President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. 1 Despite discrete federal regulatory pockets targeting specific challenges to identifiable student subpools, through the end of the twentieth century, few contested the point that, in general, education policymaking fundamentally remained a state and local enterprise. 2 This allocation of policymaking authority largely tracked the dominance of state and local financial contributions to school budgets. 3 The emergence of the twenty-first century, however, coincided with Congress enacting the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and singularly upending traditional education federalism boundaries. While different people may have had different perspectives on NCLB, few contested its dramatic implications for K-12 education federalism in general and its significant expansion of the federal footprint in particular. 4 Simply put, NCLB profoundly reshaped education federalism boundaries when it became law in 2001. Notwithstanding its profound implications for education federalism, however, NCLB did not fundamentally dislodge the primacy of state and local funding for most school budgets.
Despite not yet having fully digested NCLB and its implications for a more robust federal influence in K-12 education, Congress, once again, dramatically readjusted education federalism lines in 2015. The enactment of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) not only unwound federal shifts achieved through NCLB but also may have shifted K-12 policymaking authority back to the states and local districts more so than before NCLB, according to some scholars. 5 ESSA's relative infancy makes it difficult to assess with accuracy how it will mature and evolve over time. While ESSA's efficacy as a matter of policy remains similarly unclear at this time, what is already quite clear, however, is ESSA's effect on education federalism. To complicate education federalism matters further, at the same time that Congress toggled between NCLB and ESSA and unsettled vertical separation of power understandings, the executive branch disrupted long-standing horizontal separation of power balances with two "Dear Colleague" letters issued by the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights. 6 Quite aside from-but nonetheless related to-the dramatic shifts in education federalism boundaries themselves, a related point involves the increased velocity and rapidity of such dramatic reassignments of policymaking authority between the federal and state and local governments over education policymaking authority.
After briefly describing these important shifts in K-12 education federalism, this Essay takes a step back in an effort to gain some perspective and helpful context. Greater analytic distance from the admittedly important federalism changes achieved through relatively recent-and dramatic-congressional and executive activity ushers into sharp relief one important yet underappreciated point: While federal and state governments continue to squabble over federalism turf in the K-12 domain, a more profound shift in education authority-a shift from governments (local, state, and federal) to parents-is well underway and increasing in velocity. While many legal scholars, including constitutional and education policy scholars, understandably focus on the vertical and horizontal separation of power dimensions raised by a succession of federal legislation and administrative activities, 7 such a focus risks obscuring an equally, if not more, important long-term shift in K-12 education policymaking authority.
Evidence of an even more profound transfer of control over critical education decisionmaking authority from governments to parents and families abounds. The growing demand for charter schools, school voucher programs, tax credit programs, and homeschooling-independently and collectively-suggests that families have an almost unquenchable thirst for greater agency when it comes to decisions about their children's education. 8 To be sure, many scholars note the growth of school choice in the education context. 9 Similarly, education federalism scholarship also continues to grow. 10 What these two distinct literatures miss, however, is how the former literature implicates the latter. Specifically, while federal and state governmental officials persist with an education federalism "tug-of-war" and Congress and the Department of Education squabble over policy turf, these governmental units are 10. See, e.g., Heise, Political Economy, supra note 7, at 126-27; Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 287.
fighting over a shrinking slice of the education policy pie. That is, while intra-government federalism battles over policymaking authority persist, parents are increasingly demanding and receiving greater control over at least one critical education decision: where their kids will attend school. A reduction in real and perceived access to quality schooling partly fuels parents' increased demand for agency over where their kids will attend school. Moreover, technological advances combine with a growing supply of high quality educational and teaching materials and ready-to-use curricula to make homeschooling an increasingly plausible option for a greater number of families.
11 These factors may also disrupt existing methods of the production and distribution of education services.
While the full array of policy implications of an important shift in authority over school assignments from governments to parents remains far from clear, the rough contours of a few tentative consequences have emerged. One likely consequence is that while federal and state governments may succeed in retaining decisionmaking and policy control over the operation of public and private schools, public officials can no longer simply assume the same level of control over decisions about which students will attend which schools (public, private, or homeschools). Increased parental authority over school choice decisions complicates governments' decisions relating to school finance. Increased parental control also contributes to and reflects an increased degree of consumerism in the education space, as well as an increased desire to lever market forces in the service of education, whether public or private. Finally, increased parental consumerism and a greater influence of market forces in the education space will likely continue to both inform and disrupt how education services are presently produced and distributed.
This Essay unfolds as follows. Part I describes how federalism and separation of power boundaries in the education context remain both fluid and increasingly contested, and it places recent federal forays into elementary and secondary education into their proper historical context. Part II notes the steady growth of parental choices in the school setting over time and the persistence of its growth despite the enduring jurisdictional squabbles among federal, state, and local governments over education policy. Part III develops the claim that a focus on vertical and horizontal separation of power concerns in general and education federalism in particular risks missing a more profound change in the education policy landscape. Specifically, parents' growing calls for greater agency and control over their children's education and school options will likely eclipse political fighting over education federalism in terms of importance. The Conclusion notes that the migration of control over education control from all levels of government to parents and students represents a profound structural reallocation of power between govern-11. See infra section II.A.3. ments and their citizens when it comes to elementary and secondary education.
I. EDUCATION FEDERALISM'S DYNAMIC FLUIDITY
Despite a tradition, or at least a conventional myth, of local control that dominated education federalism for decades, 12 federalism boundaries are increasingly noted for their fluidity in the public education sector. Not only are federalism boundaries becoming increasingly fluid, but the pace of change to these boundaries has also quickened over time, no doubt a reflection of increasingly contested federalism claims. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, for example, two separate federal laws, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 13 and Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, 14 dramatically restructured the balance of power between the federal government and state and local governments. In addition, two separate "Dear Colleague" letters involving the U.S. Department of Education sought, at least implicitly, to redraw separation of power boundaries between the federal government's executive and legislative branches.
15
While education federalism disputes raise both vertical and horizontal separation of power concerns, most scholars emphasize the former. As a consequence, the conventional understanding of the term "education federalism" has evolved quickly into code for, at bottom, a demand for an increased federal role in elementary and secondary education. 16 Certainly, for those whose education federalism frame is informed by a normative preference for a greater federal role, recent scholarly accounts of education federalism remain increasingly-and largely-negative. According to Professor Kristi Bowman, for example, and with a particular eye on the school finance context, "Education federalism is failing our children."
17
Others similarly dismiss education federalism as having "hampered past efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity as the nation considers 12. For evidence of the Supreme Court's recognition of and respect for local control, see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721, 752 (1974) (holding a federal court may not "impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation problem absent any finding that the other included school districts" also fostered such segregation within the district in question); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) adopting new efforts to achieve this vital national goal." 18 Finally, with specific reference to the recently enacted ESSA, Professor Derek Black warns that federal disengagement with K-12 education in favor of the states poses a fundamental threat to America's goal of and promise for equal educational opportunity.
19
A. Vertical Separation of Powers
Successive substantial federal legislative forays into the K-12 education sector since 2000 reveal persistent unease with-and uncertainty about-the federal government's proper policy role in the K-12 education setting. These federal legislative forays imply dramatically different views about vertical separation of power and, as a consequence, illustrate how education federalism boundaries have changed and how the velocity of change has increased over time. It is one thing for federal programs to focus on discrete student subpools, but it is quite another for federal programs to engage with broader elementary and secondary education policy. And while early federal legislation began targeting specific subpools of students, it wasn't until 1994 and the passage of the Improving America's Schools Act (IASA) 26 that Congress widened its regulatory scope and posture and took aim at broader policy issues (for example, states' standards and assessments) that implicated all elementary and secondary schools and students. Despite the federal government's increasingly robust policy presence in K-12 schools, prior to 2000 and NCLB's emergence, the thrust of the federal government's involvement was generally targeted to specific policy objectives and discrete student subpools. It is worth noting, however, that a characterization of Congress's policymaking role in K-12 education up to 2001 that emphasizes its limitations is not meant to diminish the federal government's important and growing presence in the nation's schools. For example, one critical facet of a multidecade and, to some extent, ongoing effort to desegregate and integrate public schools played out in the nation's federal courts. 31 The engine that drove this exchange relied on fuel supplied by state-determined standard-and-assessment regimes. 32 The ignition spark involved federally enforced accountability measures that pivoted on determinations of adequate yearly progress for student academic achievement 33 measured by annual student testing. 34 In so doing, however, Congress "substantially expanded and restructured the federal role in elementary and secondary education and . . . ultimately shaped a new educational federalism." 35 In the service of the federal government's effort to help improve student achievement and close nagging achievement gaps, NCLB reset the education federalism boundary in a manner substantially more favorable to federal authority. Even a nimble (and, candidly, creative and entrepreneurial) exercise of federal authority cannot easily escape important federalism questions, however. NCLB raised-but did not squarely confront-a critical structural education federalism question: whether to decouple education policy authority and funding responsibility. More specifically, NCLB raised the question of whether, from a policy perspective, it is prudent to permit the federal government to influence elementary and secondary school policy beyond the extent of the federal government's financial contribution to state and local school district budgets.
While some understood NCLB as a creative-if unusually aggressiveuse of federal authority, other scholars were not as generous in their assessments. For example, then-Professor James Ryan (now Dean of Harvard's Graduate School of Education) zeroed in on the very factor that-while probably necessary for NCLB to claim sufficient constitutional authority and likely necessary for political passage-nonetheless generated criticism. What Ryan found particularly troublesome about NCLB was that, although it assigned the federal government authority to sanction states for failing to meet academic standards and assessments, it assigned to states the right to define student assessment thresholds.
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Ryan went on to note that resolving NCLB's internal structural problem would have required the federal government to "get off the federalism fence." 44 In the end, some of NCLB's structural problems-whether necessitated by federalism concerns or not-became quickly exposed as states, confronting the perceived or real threat of federal sanctions for failing to achieve adequate yearly progress, transformed academic standards 41. See id. at 130-35 (arguing that NCLB stresses-though does not necessarily violate-the conditional spending requirements articulated in Dole).
42. In the interest of full disclosure, I was among those who argued that NCLB was not necessarily unconstitutional. My argument at that time assumed that NCLB did not impermissibly coerce state and local school districts because its conditional spending was better understood as a reimbursement rather than as a regulatory mandate. I concluded that while NCLB certainly pushed the envelope of education federalism boundaries through its strategic use of political-economic leverage, it did not constitute an unconstitutional act of statutory coercion despite evidence of the Act's "coercion" plainly visible in the education policy domain. See 46 However, such a statutory mandate was, as Professor Black describes, "unrealistic under any circumstances."
47 As NCLB's obligations "came due" for many states-something conceptually analogous to a "balloon mortgage" 48 preparing to explode-what became obvious to all, particularly the states, was that without statutory relief, virtually all states were in jeopardy of losing eligibility for federal funding, which constitutes roughly ten percent of an average school district's budget. 49 Indeed, by 2012, eighty percent of the nation's public schools were predicted to fail to achieve adequate yearly progress under NCLB and, thus, were exposed to an array of consequences under federal law.
50
Absent congressional reauthorization, NCLB was set to automatically expire in 2007. 51 Many states' difficulties with meeting their own proficiency benchmarks made it abundantly clear to most observers that NCLB's reauthorization would involve more than mere tinkering and, 47. Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 117); see also Black, Lessons, supra note 46, at 1752-56.
48. Under traditional "balloon" mortgages, a large percentage of the loan's remaining principle is due at the end of the mortgage period. For a discussion of how this conceptback-ending requirements-applies in the NCLB context, see, e.g., instead, require a substantial statutory overhaul. 52 The financial crisis and health care reform legislation certainly contributed to a political climate that resulted in inattention to and a delay of NCLB's necessary reauthorization.
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A political inability or unwillingness to reauthorize NCLB, combined with a growing number of states' failure to achieve adequate yearly progress, set up an inevitable political collision. 54 This collision approached, accelerated by a swelling political backlash against NCLB. 55 Perhaps sensing a policy opening or frustrated with Congress's neglect of NCLB's needed reauthorization, the Obama Administration began to leverage NCLB ever further. Specifically, in 2011, Education Secretary Arne Duncan implemented a policy of granting states relief from NCLB in the form of administrative waivers. 56 Even more troubling, however, was that Secretary Duncan imposed conditions on those states requesting federal regulatory waivers. For states, the political "price" of a waiver included an agreement to adopt specific favored federal education policies, notably the Common Core Standards. 57 As even ardent supporters of a robust federal presence in K-12 education concede, Secretary Duncan's waiver actions lacked "any specific legislative authority."
58 As a consequence of his actions, and untethered from federal law, Secretary Duncan succeeded in federalizing "core aspects of education in just a few short months." 59 By using the administrative waiver process as "a substitute for the legislative process," the Obama Administration functionally worked around traditional lawmaking institutions, notably Congress, and, in so doing, redrew separation of power boundaries and encroached upon states' sovereignty. 60 Anxious to avoid the stigma of having schools labeled by 52. See Black, Lessons, supra note 46, at 1756 (noting NCLB set unrealistic performance expectations that were unlikely to be met by states).
53. See Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 120). While reasonable minds can and do differ over the efficacy of the Obama Administration's particular use of regulatory waivers in the NCLB context, the tactic clearly raises important questions about basic federalism structure, including judicially enforced lines articulated in conditional spending decisions. 64 While some scholars approve of the imposition of policy conditions in exchange for federal regulatory waivers for an array of policy silos, 65 such practices typically survive constitutional scrutiny only when carefully crafted supporting legislative authority exists. 66 According to Professor Black, however, Secretary Duncan "lacked that authority." 67 As such, the legislative workarounds pursued by Secretary Duncan in the education context fundamentally differed from analogous legislative workarounds in other policy domains. And this fundamental difference underscores the federalism concerns raised by the federal regulatory waivers from NCLB. Consequently, the federalization of education policy in the Obama Administration, however "momentous," remained "legally unfounded."
68 More specifically, in addition to separation of power and federalism concerns, Secretary Duncan's use of conditional waiver authority in this manner also may 61. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 955-57 (noting NCLB "imposes swifter and harsher sanctions than most state systems").
62 While much about ESSA and its full effects has not yet emerged, the implications for educational federalism boundaries are already palpable. According to one of ESSA's key sponsors, Tennessee Republican Senator Lamar Alexander, ESSA represents a "significant devolution of power" over K-12 schooling from the federal government to the states. 71 One critical way that ESSA departs from NCLB and enhances states' power is by permitting them to develop, test, and measure academic metrics and standards. Aside from a requirement for standards to be "challenging" (notably left undefined), ESSA now delegates to the states the task of developing academic standards. And in direct response to the Obama Administration's use of conditional waivers, ESSA expressly permits those states that previously adopted Common Core standardswhether in exchange for regulatory relief or not-to withdraw and replace those academic standards.
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More dramatic differences between NCLB and ESSA exist in the accountability domain. Actual consequences for failure to achieve adequate annual testing results typically reside at the structural core of any accountability regime. To this end, one of NCLB's pillars was that it held states and districts accountable for failures to achieve adequate yearly progress, 73 and the consequences became increasingly severe for persistent failures. 74 Indeed, in many ways, the political pressure from a growing number of states and districts worried about their exposure under NCLB helps explain the states' appetite for the Obama Administration's unusually aggressive use of regulatory waivers.
In yearly testing results' weight when it comes to annual school, district, and teacher performance. 75 That is, ESSA largely relieves states and districts from the federal consequences that flow from inadequate yearly student academic progress. In its place, ESSA imposes potential federal sanctions and requires states to intervene in only a discrete, small subset of schools: those in the bottom five percent of a state and those high schools with graduation rates below sixty-seven percent.
76 Nesting standards-setting and accountability mechanisms in federal authority under NCLB was among NCLB's hallmarks. ESSA, in contrast, affords states greater autonomy, both in terms of control over substantive standards setting and the consequences for states that fail to achieve their own self-defined achievement goals.
Finally, in a largely symbolic-though nonetheless notable-gesture, ESSA expressly limits the ability of the U.S. Secretary of Education to reject or impose conditions upon state-initiated remediation plans. 77 Recall that during Duncan's tenure as Education Secretary, the Department of Education engaged in what even his supporters acknowledge was an aggressive use of conditional waiver granting that, at once, relieved most states from unwelcome adverse consequences for failing to achieve adequate yearly progress under NCLB and induced states to implement a federal preference for Common Core standards. 78 Rather than permit similar statutory "end-runs" by future Education Secretaries, ESSA expressly eliminated the waiver activity that took place earlier in the Obama Administration.
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Despite ample evidence illustrating how ESSA increases state authority and autonomy, it is important to note the parts of ESSA that preserve and, indeed, increase certain federal roles. For example, ESSA focuses federal attention on the bottom five percent of schools within each state as well as those high schools struggling with graduation rate problems. 80 Again, from a federalism perspective the juxtaposition of NCLB and ESSA's scope could not be starker-the former functionally implicated every K-12 school while the latter restricts federal obligations to only five percent of a state's schools. ESSA's narrowed statutory focus is important for policy and political reasons. On the policy level, a focus on the lowestperforming schools may generate the necessary attention to those schools 75 81 Finally, in one discrete context-preschool education-federal policy authority increased.
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On balance, however, ESSA clearly reverses the previous educational federalism boundaries established by NCLB. While NCLB may have functionally "federalized" K-12 education policy, ESSA is noted principally for redirecting education policy from the federal government back to the states. 83 According to one of the leading Senate sponsors of ESSA, Senator Alexander, a resetting of education federalism boundaries in this direction was entirely consistent with the legislative intent.
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What to make of this education federalism boundary shift remains contested. Some applaud ESSA's reallocation of federal-state power in the K-12 sector on purely structural and historic grounds. 85 Others, while acknowledging states' greater authority under ESSA, fear the secondary and tertiary consequences threatened by an increase in state autonomy and a corresponding decrease in federal control. 86 According to its critics, who are not difficult to find, ESSA "moves education in a direction that was unthinkable just a few short years ago: no definite equity provisions, no demands for specific student achievement, and no enforcement mechanism to prompt states to consistently pursue equity or achievement."
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Despite differing opinions on the implications of the migration from NCLB to ESSA for education federalism, many agree that the latter 89 Indeed, some commentators note that ESSA will, eventually, "supersede the many waivers offered to some forty-two states to the NCLB requirements which the Obama administration had used to buy political time while moving education reform forward." Pat McCrory quickly filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief vindicating his state's law. 94 On that same day, the Justice Department filed its own lawsuit asking a federal court to declare that the North Carolina law violated federal law. 95 While North Carolina subsequently repealed House Bill 2, the debate it ignited persists. 96 On May 13, 2016, the Obama Administration's Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education (OCR) and Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice released a "Dear Colleague" letter to all recipient institutions bound by Title IX designed to prohibit discrimination based on a student's gender identity. 97 Specifically, the letter asserts that for Title IX purposes the federal government "treat[s] a student's gender identity as the student's sex." 98 OCR's "Dear Colleague" letter expressly purported to provide "significant guidance" rather than expand Title IX's legal obligations on schools. 99 While the letter implicated an array of school activities and programs, 100 in the public's mind the issue became quickly joined with growing disputes over "restroom access" and the implications for transgender students. 101 Despite the continued public and growing legal atten- The current Administration's withdrawal of the OCR "Dear Colleague" letter informed ongoing litigation. In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, a transgender student sought access to the school bathroom that corresponded with the student's gender identity rather than the student's at-birth sex assignment. 103 The Gloucester County School Board initially granted the transgender student's request, but after some community members expressed disapproval, the Board implemented a policy that limited students to school bathrooms that correspond with their at-birth sex assignment. 104 After the adoption of the new restroom policy, the student turned to litigation and sought relief under Title IX. 105 The student's request for a preliminary injunction was denied by a federal district court, which also concluded that the student failed to state a legal claim.
106
The student's appeal to the Fourth Circuit, however, proved more successful. Reversing some evidentiary rulings by the trial court, the Fourth Circuit also concluded that the OCR's "Dear Colleague" letter was entitled to some degree of legal deference-specifically, Auer deference 107 -as it evidences the Department of Education's interpretation of Title IX. 108 The Supreme Court initially stayed the matter. After agreeing to hear the appeal, the Supreme Court later decided to vacate and remand the Fourth Circuit's decision to the appeals court in light of the current Administration's withdrawal of the "Dear Colleague" letter, which figured so prominently in the Fourth Circuit's original decision. 109 title-ix-crisis [http://perma.cc/9ASK-DC44] (describing the OCR's "Dear Colleague" letter and the "clear" threat that "schools that failed to comply could lose federal funding").
102 110 Specifically, the Obama Administration's Education Department construed sexual assault as sexual "harassment" for purposes of Title IX. 111 As Harvard Law Professor Jeannie Suk Gersen describes in a New Yorker essay, the OCR letter went on to detail specifically how schools, colleges, and universities needed to adapt their student disciplinary policies and procedures with respect to incidences of alleged sexual assault, with particular reference to lowering burden of proof standards. 112 A recipient institution that failed to comply with Title IX risked losing federal funding.
113
Unlike prior OCR policy guidance, including so-called "significant" policy guidance, 114 the 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter did not benefit from formal administrative law notice-and-comment requirements. 115 As it relates to OCR's particular directive to colleges and universities to reduce the applicable standard of proof burden to the civil preponderance threshold in campus sexual assault hearings, 116 the OCR sought to justify its position on the grounds that this was the standard used in Title VII hearings. 117 What makes OCR's position uncomfortable, however, is that OCR's "Dear Colleague" letter did not also adopt Title VII's protections for the accused. 118 If that omission were not enough, in an ironic twist the OCR "Dear Colleague" letter also expressly recommended against some of the procedural safeguards included in Title VII. 111. Id. at 1-2. 112. Id. at 11 ("Thus, in order for a school's grievance procedures to be consistent with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard (i.e., it is more likely than not that sexual harassment or violence occurred)."); see also Gersen, supra note 101 (describing the April 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter and its ramifications). 116. See Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence, supra note 110, at 11. 117. Id. at 10-11. 118. These protections include, but are not limited to, a right to demand a jury trial, cross-examine witnesses, and confront the complainant. For a discussion see Lave, supra note 115, at 390.
119. See id.
Notwithstanding the procedural and substantive concerns with OCR's legal interpretation of Title IX, many schools, colleges, and universities quickly adopted campus-level policies and practices consistent with those articulated in the "Dear Colleague" letter. 120 What has ensued, however, includes a string of notable and notably successful lawsuits against these very schools, colleges, and universities brought by students accused under the new OCR guidelines complaining of an array of due process violations. 121 As legal and related financial exposure continues to mount for many colleges and universities on this front, 122 a number of higher education administrators, many of whom previously may have welcomed-indeed, encouraged-OCR's "guidance," are now quickly rethinking their position and beginning to push back against OCR's "guidance." For example, one harbinger is that while Harvard University adapted its university-wide student sexual assault code to conform with OCR "guidance,"
123 Harvard Law School, alarmed by the dire due process implications for those accused and subjected to policies and procedures promoted by the OCR "Dear Colleague" letter, declined to follow the university's lead and instead developed and now employs its own set of policies and procedures that differ in critical ways from the university-wide approach. IX requires of schools, colleges, and universities when policing campus sexual assault. 125 Secretary DeVos expressed alarm at too many instances of "kangaroo courts" on campuses that ill-served accusers and the accused.
126 Notably, she committed to a review process that, consistent with Administrative Procedure Act requirements, will involve traditional notice-and-comment of proposed rules. Despite unsurprising criticism from many interest groups, 127 opinion pieces appearing in the New York Times voiced clear support for Secretary DeVos' announcement. 128 While it is all but certain that the Obama Administration's 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter will be rendered moot by forthcoming actions by the current Administration, it remains thus far unclear whether Secretary DeVos will seek to formally withdraw the 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter during the pendency of the Department's review of Title IX.
3. "Dear Colleague" Letters' Implications for Horizontal Separation of Power. -Setting aside the merits of and controversies surrounding gender-identity and campus sexual-assault policies and procedures, admittedly important topics, a comparatively underappreciated issue raised by the OCR "Dear Colleague" letters involves horizontal separation of powers, particularly as related to education federalism. Specifically, the issue revealed an important conflict between Congress and the executive branch over education federalism.
A Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) hearing on June 26, 2014, illustrated this conflict and featured a particularly pointed and heated exchange between the Committee Chair, Senator Alexander, and Catherine Lhamon, an Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights at the Department of Education. 129 The protracted interaction focused on technical questions involving OCR's specific legal authority to enact its desired policy changes to Title IX through its 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter. Senator Alexander worried aloud that by dressing the Department of Education's demands as "significant guidance," the Department was essentially trying to enact new "law" without adhering to the requirements imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, notably the requirements for notice and public comment. 130 and benefits from formal legal training.
134 Within a year of Assistant Secretary Lhamon's clash with Senator Alexander, OCR officials began to publicly retreat from their original assertions, as well as from the explicit text of the "Dear Colleague" letter itself, and ultimately conceded that OCR's "Dear Colleague" letters are not, in fact, legally binding upon the recipient educational institutions despite previous public assertions to the contrary. 135 Substance aside, the series of exchanges involving Senator Alexander and various OCR officials helpfully distills, isolates, and identifies conflicts that can arise between the legislative and executive federal branches when it comes to control over federal law. Increasingly, these conflicts involve education federalism.
II. SCHOOL CHOICE'S PERSISTENT GROWTH
In early September 2016, then-candidate Trump announced that, if elected President, he would transform $20 billion of existing federal education funds into a block grant to states that could be deployed for the benefit of private, charter, or public schools. 136 President Trump's political impulse is one of the more recent-and prominent-political reflections of a persistently growing parental demand for greater choice when it comes to K-12 education. Evidence of ever-increasing parental appetite for greater school choice is not hard to find.
Indeed, President Trump's support for increased school choice reflects a continuation of a political trend that began in earnest long before President Trump took the oath of office. A gradual shift in the production and delivery of K-12 education services from a "sectorcentered" perspective to what Professor Nicole Garnett refers to as a "child-centered" perspective has accelerated over time. 137 The array of factors propelling a net growth in school choice demands includes the "exponential growth" of charter schools, complemented by a more recent increase in the availability of publicly funded school voucher programs. 138 Similarly, concurrent increases in homeschool participation as well as more traditional public schools of choice (for example, magnet schools) also contribute to net increases in parental demands for greater autonomy when it comes to school decisions concerning their children.
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At the same time the supply of school options available to parents increased, one paradoxical consequence of the recently discarded NCLB also helped fuel parents' growing appetite for greater school choice. Specifically, one consequence of NCLB's testing and reporting requirements was that they laid bare persistent academic struggles in numerous public schools and districts, including some comparatively affluent suburban districts that, until NCLB, were presumed to be performing at a higher level. 140 The increased availability of systematic information, however modest, about schools' academic performance propelled more parents to increase their demands for greater school choices for their children.
A. Evidence of Increased School Choice
Given the plethora of school choice options-options that exist within the public school sphere as well as options between the public and non-public school markets of interest in school choice involves changes over time in the percentage of students attending their government "assigned" public schools. Data from the U.S. Department of Education make clear that this percentage has declined from 80% in 1993 to 73% in 2007. 142 To put this 7% decline into some context, the Department of Education reports that in 2013 just over fifty million students attended public K-12 schools. 143 A 7% decline in students attending their traditional government "assigned" public schools implies an approximate drop of 3.5 million students over a fifteen-year period.
Interestingly, the increased availability and flexibility of public funding helps fuel some of the attendance decline in students' assigned public schools. To be sure, flexible public funding enables some families to attend alternative public school options, such as charter and magnet schools, which are inter-and intra-district school choices. Other families, by contrast, use public funds to exercise their Pierce rights and seek out various non-public school options, including private and private religious schools, homeschooling, and virtual schools.
144 Also notable is the variation of school choice options across the states. A 2013 report from the Council of Chief State School Officers notes that while all states provide at least some form of alternative to assigned public schools for some portion of students, none of the states provide all forms of school choice options to all students. 145 While growth-trend curves differ across various school choice options, the cumulative effect of these options is evidence of slow and steady, if uneven, growth over time. 146 charter schools helped fuel a similar increase in the number of students attending charter schools. Indeed, during these same years, 2000 to 2014, charter school enrollment increased by more than 740%.
148 Finally, and perhaps most saliently, charter school enrollments grew as a percentage of total public school enrollment. In 2000, charter school enrollment accounted for less than 1% of total public school enrollment. 149 By 2014, that percentage grew to 5.1%. 150 When one adds public magnet schools into this mix, the drain on traditional "assigned" public school enrollment doubles. In 2014, of the 49.7 million students attending public schools, more than 5 million, or 10 percent of, students chose to attend charter or magnet public schools-that is, to attend a public school other than a student's "assigned" public school.
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Not surprisingly, charter schools vary-sometimes tremendouslyboth within and across states. 152 Although charter schools are, in a formal legal sense, public institutions, one trend within the public-charterschool market includes the growing use of private management companies to operate public charter schools.
153 Interestingly, the lurch toward privatization straddles traditional political labels. 154 The cumulative effect of multiple administrations over time, both Republican and Democratic, is that "there are about seven thousand publicly-funded, privatelymanaged charter schools, enrolling nearly three million students." 155 Charter schools' significant growth should not deflect attention from another genre of intra-district school choice: magnet schools. Historically, magnet schools' origins partly reflect public school districts' (typically larger urban public districts) desire to increase desegregation and student achievement through schools that usually feature particular 1999 -2000 Through 2013 academic focus or curricular orientation. 156 While magnet schools vary in terms of their focus and efficacy, they remain an attractive option for many families. 157 Indeed, both the raw number of magnet schools as well as the number of students attending them more than doubled between 2001 and 2014. 158 Despite magnet schools' variety, for purposes of this Essay, the two key characteristics that bind them are that they dislodge students away from geographically assigned public schools and provide parents and students with additional education options. Voucher programs, both publicly and privately funded, seek, in part, to reduce barriers to the private school market for families. 164 Early voucher programs tended to focus on either students from low-income households or students assigned to struggling public schools or both. By navigating critical open constitutional questions at that time, 165 some early privately funded voucher programs operated as de facto pilot programs and, in addition to serving students and their families, set out to generate data and political support and increase the constituency for broader, more comprehensive publicly funded voucher programs. 166 Contributing much to the recent growth in publicly funded voucher programs is a shift in voucher programs' initial focus on students from low-income households and those assigned to struggling public schools to a broader slice of middle-class students. While political realities typically prompted publicly and privately funded voucher programs to focus on those students most in need of additional school choices, as the politics surrounding school choice has evolved so too has voucher programs' focus. Now, ironically, successful political support for voucher programs typically requires that the programs include middle-class families as well. 167 The often-uneasy relations between the private-school-voucher and charter-school movements also continue to inject political complexities into the school choice debate. While early privately funded voucher programs sought to stimulate the development of publicly funded voucher programs, one consequence was an acceleration of public charter schools' popularity. 168 As the specter of increased school choice grew, so too did political resistance to it. 169 And this political resistance uncovered unexpected alliances between, for example, teacher unions, reacting to the threat posed by increased private school enrollments, and traditionally "suburban Republicans," who are, in general, content with their public schools and threatened by the prospect of increasing access to them for lower-income urban students. 170 As Professor Garnett notes, however, it remains possible that, in the end, the surge in charter schools and their popularity will bleed over into increased political support for school-voucher programs. 3. Homeschooling and Online Education. -While presently the least significant in terms of the raw number of students served, homeschooling represents another and increasingly important threat to publicschool market share. In the homeschool sector, it is difficult to overestimate the influence of technological advances and the growing supply of and access to high quality education content, particularly the development of "turn-key" online education content. 172 The interaction of these two factors has made homeschooling an increasingly plausible option for a far greater percentage of American families, both in terms of cost and execution. Given technological advances as well as dramatic increases in online content availability, it is not surprising that the Department of Education reports that from 2003 to 2012 the percentage of homeschooled K-12 students in the United States increased from 2.2% to 3.4%, and the raw number of homeschooled children increased by almost 62%. 169. See generally Ryan & Heise, supra note 9 (noting the significance of historical suburban resistance to school desegregation and school-finance reform).
170. See Garnett, supra note 137, at 25 (noting suburban Republicans are generally "happy with their public schools and unhappy about the prospect of poor urban students enrolling in them"); Ryan & Heise, supra note 9, at 2045, 2080 ("Suburban parents are generally satisfied with the public schools their children attend, and they want to protect both the physical and the financial sanctity of these schools.").
171. In addition to homeschooling growth trends, another notable wrinkle in the homeschool context is the evolving composition of households engaged in homeschooling and its deeper penetration into American society. Between 2003 and 2012, the percentage of homeschooling parents possessing a graduate or professional degree increased and the percentage of parents with no more than a high school diploma decreased. 174 Similarly, the median household income of homeschooled children has increased. 175 The broadening of the pool of families engaged in homeschooling has led some to characterize homeschools as "mainstream." As overall federal education spending includes far more support for an array of school choice options, trends in federal financial support for K-12 schools warrant careful attention for at least two reasons. First, while the school-finance context is one noted for sustained and protracted litigation, principally in state courts, 177 the dynamic blend of education-funding sources is important for its potential federalism implications. To the extent that the federal government contributes a greater relative and absolute amount of education funding, a correlative increase in federal policy preferences would plausibly-and logically-follow. A second, and more subtle, reason involves the interaction among the various sources of public financial support for education and the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This interaction may have contributed to increased parental demands for school choice, which, as previously discussed, plausibly reflects and implicates a shift in education decisionmaking authority from governments to families and students.
1. Education Spending. Table 1 does not convey is the dynamic, real overall growth in per-pupil spending in America's public elementary and secondary schools over these same years. Table 2 illustrates that, despite a recent downturn beginning in the 2009-2010 school year, for almost the past century public school perpupil spending in the United States in real dollars displays a marked, steady increase over time. Interestingly, the combination of Tables 1 and  2 implies that one source of the per-pupil spending drop in 2010 can be attributed to an absolute and comparative reduction in state education spending triggered by the financial crisis.
As Table 2 illustrates, there has been a nearly unbroken trend of increased per-pupil spending since 1920, excepting school years following 2009. The timing of this important break and the financial crisis cannot, obviously, be ascribed to mere coincidence. Given the broad and deep financial devastation of the crisis, its deleterious implications for public and private budgets are similarly unsurprising. devolution of education decisionmaking authority from governments to families and students. 181 Along with its impact on public education funding, the 2007-2008 financial crisis financially devastated many households. 182 Given the financial crisis's magnitude, the collateral damage inevitably included some children, specifically moving some children from private schools back to public schools. Thus, students who previously attended private schools now found themselves in public schools owing to familial financial exigency. Some of these students and their families undoubtedly brought their preferences for greater school choice with them and began to push for greater public and publicly funded school choice. While parental demands for greater control over schooling options for their children predated the financial crisis, an influx of students from families predisposed toward greater school choice, as demonstrated by their preference for private school, into public schools will likely steepen the overall demand curve for greater parental autonomy.
C. Demand for Public School: A Comparatively Smaller Slice of a Shrinking Pie
An increasing demand for non-public school alternatives has over time eroded public schools' market share of students. At the same time, demographic data convey a relatively static supply of school-age children. While the raw number of school-aged-defined as five-to seventeen-yearold-resident Americans between 2000 and 2010 suggests minimal growth, specifically around 1%, assessing school-aged, resident Americans as a percentage of the total resident population demonstrates a 1.5% decline from 18.9% to 17.4% in the same period. 183 If one goes back to the 1969-1970 school year, the drop climbs to around 8%, from 25.8% to 17.4%. 184 Thus, the interaction of a demonstrably increasing appetite for school choice and a static supply of school-age children more accurately captures the contours of the challenges now confronting public schools and their potential customers.
A comparatively decreasing appetite for traditional, "assigned" public schools raises important social, political, and economic issues for public schools and school officials. To the extent that any stigma previously existed for those families who, for whatever reason, opted out of their assigned public schools, 185 that stigma attaching to families seeking schooling alternatives has dissipated, as non-assigned-publicschool and non-public-school attendance has increased, both in absolute and relative terms.
Politically and economically, the stakes are even higher for public schools. While the politics surrounding school choice policies are anything but clear, political support for public schools remains important, indeed critical. Insofar as public school budgets are a function of a public's willingness to tax itself, public schools' financial health depends on popular political support for public schools. 186 Families who opt out of public schools altogether likely absorb private school tuition on top of their property tax contributions, which help fund local public schools. As a result, their appetite to "invest" in local public schools likely diminishes, at least at the margins.
To be sure, it remains important to note that property owners retain an economic incentive to support even those local public schools that their kids do not attend. After all, in many districts, including many affluent suburban districts, homeowners pay a premium for property located in a public school district benefitting from a favorable reputation. 187 Given the direct economic relation between perceptions of public-school-district quality and property values, even property owners without school-age children or those with children who have opted out of public schools still have an important economic incentive to help ensure that positive perceptions of the assigned school district persist.
These constantly evolving political, social, and economic dynamics help fuel political turbulence surrounding school choice that increasingly straddles traditional political labels and exhibits complex political dynamics. 188 To be sure, Republican administrations have been comparatively more hospitable to the idea of increased competition among schools, including public schools. 189 One recent example is President Trump's initial address to a joint session of Congress in January 2017, in which Trump made clear his Administration's support for, among other education reforms, publicly funded voucher programs that expressly include homeschooling. 190 The drive at the federal level for increased competition among schools is not confined to Republican administrations, however. As Diane Ravitch, a staunch and vocal school choice critic, notes, the "Obama administration [was] just as enthusiastic about privately managed charter schools as the Republicans." 191 Consequently, contributing to the political complexities surrounding school choice is that traditional, reliable political "markers" increasingly do not provide much predictive force in the education context.
III. WHAT A FOCUS ON TRADITIONAL EDUCATION FEDERALISM RISKS MISSING-AND WHY IT MATTERS
An ongoing federalism "tug-of-war" between the federal and state governments, as well as among the federal branches, over education policy control shows no sign of abating anytime soon. Indeed, if anything, the juxtaposition of NCLB and ESSA, along with the controversy surrounding the confirmation of President Trump's Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos, makes quite clear that fights over education federalism boundaries are, if anything, heating up. These boundary fights, particularly in light of recent political turbulence, will also continue to attract scholarly and public attention. And, to be sure, the distribution of education policy authority-both horizontally and vertically-deserves some attention, as who decides can often be as, if not more, important as what is decided.
To argue, as this Essay does, that increased school choice will diminish the comparative importance of education federalism squabbles is not to argue that education federalism will become unimportant. Obviously, and for good reasons, federalism boundaries matter, as they should, and they will continue to matter in the education context and elsewhere. On the horizontal axis, important questions about whether education policy is or should be primarily an executive or legislative function will persist. President Trump's recent decision to formally withdraw a "Dear Colleague" letter concerning transgender school-bathroom access is one recent example of this ongoing structural separation of power tension and one that has already yielded palpable legal and policy consequences. 194 To the extent that both branches will continue to participate, fights over policy control between Congress and the Executive Branch will not go away, particularly when political control over Congress and the presidency is divided between Republicans and Democrats.
Similarly, as the quick transition from NCLB to ESSA amply illustrates, analogous fights over education policy will endure between the federal and state governments (and, in a similar manner, between state governments and local school districts). The evolving composition of school budgets from federal, state, and local sources contributes to and, indeed, exacerbates vertical separation of power tensions. 195 
CONCLUSION
Acknowledging that education federalism concerns will likely-and appropriately-endure, however, does not diminish this Essay's central point: that a focus on education federalism and its related squabbles risks missing a critical shift in education control occasioned by increased demand and capacity for school choice, broadly defined. School choice shifts fundamental power from governments at all levels to parents and their schoolchildren. Such a move restructures the balance of power between governments and citizens with respect to school attendance and materially disrupts a status quo that structurally favors public school attendance.
Given the importance of education to an individual's ability to participate fully in the nation's economic, political, and social realms, that states compel some amount of education is unremarkable. 196 discharge their affirmative schooling obligations through public-and non-public-school attendance. 197 The distribution of families able to fully exercise their Pierce rights, however, predictably skews in a direction that favors the wealthy over the poor. 198 To the extent that school choice policies increase education autonomy for a greater number and percentage of families, a corresponding shift in power from governments to families will result.
